The use of moral appeals to a¤ect the behavior of others is pervasive (from the pulpit to ethics classes) but little is known about the e¤ects of moral suasion on behavior. In a series of experiments we study whether moral suasion a¤ects behavior in voluntary contribution games and the mechanisms by which behavior is altered. We …nd that observing a message with a moral standard according to the golden rule or, alternatively, utilitarian philosophy, results in a signi…cant but transitory increase in contributions above the levels observed for subjects that did not receive a message or received a message that advised them to contribute without a moral rationale. When players have the option of punishing each other after the contribution stage, the e¤ect of the moral messages on contributions becomes persistent: punishments and moral messages interact to sustain cooperation. We also investigate the mechanisms through which moral suasion operates and …nd it a¤ects both expectations and preferences.
Introduction
While economics pays great attention to the use of material incentives to shape behavior, everyday life abounds in examples where individuals are encouraged not through material incentives but through appeals of a normative kind. Instances of moral suasion are ubiquitous -they take place in religious ceremonies ("avoid sin"), political arguments ("this policy is the right thing to do"), they are part of educational indoctrination ("it is wrong to cheat"), marketing strategy ("buy fair trade"), and the workplace ("be a teamplayer"). This suggests that there might be room for motivation through moral appeals beyond what money or other forms of compensation can buy.
Much empirical and experimental research in economics has focussed on measuring how material incentives can be manipulated to a¤ect behavior. We have no equivalent body of knowledge on the e¤ectiveness of moral suasion. In this paper we report on a series of experiments designed to ascertain the e¤ects of moral suasion on cooperation. We expose subjects to di¤erent messages, some of which contain a moral argument. We then evaluate the e¤ects of messages on subsequent contribution levels in a public goods game. We focus on this game because it captures neatly the clash between individual and collective rationality that motivates moral thinking and much of politics and public …nance. In fact, normative political theory often presupposes that normative discourse can a¤ect behavior, and align private and social objectives.
1 However, whether normative discourse can a¤ect behavior, especially in strategic situations that capture the tension between individual and collective, is to the best of our knowledge unknown.
Establishing a causal role for normative statements faces important identi…cation hurdles.
The explanation of some historical event that invokes the prevalence of normative ideas meets with the suspicion of endogeneity. Further investigation may always unveil deeper causes linked to the distribution of power, economic forces, or institutional factors, and suggest that the prevalence of normative ideas is itself the result of those deeper forces. These di¢ culties recommend the use of a laboratory study where exposure to normative ideas can be varied exogenously.
In this paper we report on a series of experiments in which subjects were exposed to di¤erent messages, some of which contained a moral argument. We evaluate the e¤ects of those messages on contribution levels in a public goods game. We explore not only whether moral appeals a¤ect behavior but also how moral suasion depends on aspects of strategic interaction, in an attempt to disentangle the mechanisms by which moral suasion operates.
In our …rst experiment we focus on establishing the existence of a moral suasion e¤ect.
Each session consisted of twenty rounds of a two-person public good game where subjects were randomly rematched after each round. Subjects were given an endowment in each round that they could invest on either a personal account or a joint, "productive" account.
Investments in the personal account were retained by the subject. Investments in the joint account were multiplied by 1.4, but divided evenly between the two players of the round, thus yielding an individual net return of only 0.7 per unit invested. The symmetric e¢ cient outcome and Utilitarian optimum is to contribute the entire endowment to the joint account while the unique Nash equilibrium for sel…sh preferences is to contribute zero. Between rounds 10 and 11 subjects saw a randomly chosen message out of a set of …ve possible messages, including two messages with distinct moral content. One stated that moral actions are those that treat others as you would like to be treated. This principle, usually called the "golden rule," has been present in most cultures and religions throughout history (Wattles 1996) . The other moral message had a consequentialist, Utilitarian root (see Mill 1863) . It stated that actions are moral to the extent that they contribute to maximizing collective payo¤s. The remaining three messages were as follows. One was a blank message, which provided a basic control. Another was a simple suggestion to contribute that did not involve an explicitly moral backing, and which was included to control for potential demand e¤ects.
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The last message stated that in game theory rational and sel…sh individuals are assumed to maximize their own payo¤s. All subjects in the same group saw the same message.
The …rst experiment revealed that the moral messages had a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on contributions. Contributions in the pre-message phase were statistically indistinguishable across the …ve messages. But the average contributions in the post-message phase of the experiment were higher for the two moral treatments than in the pre-message phase, something that was not true for the other three messages. The e¤ect of the moral appeals was transitory. While contributions in the …rst few post-message rounds were higher for the moral treatment groups, they were not signi…cantly higher for the last rounds.
One reason why the moral suasion e¤ect appears transitory is that in our …rst experiment participants could only punish low contributors by lowering their own contributions. To see if moral suasion e¤ects can be persistent, in our second experiment we added a punishment stage after the contribution stage in each round, as in Ostrom et al. (1992) and Gächter (2000) . This allowed players to punish low contributors without having to lower their own contributions. We then exposed subjects to one of two messages, either the blank message or the golden rule message. The pre-message rounds displayed higher cooperation levels than in the …rst experiment (where punishment was not allowed), although they continued to display a decreasing trend. The golden rule message triggered a signi…cant increase in contributions. Moreover, in the presence of punishment, the e¤ect of the moral message was persistent. While moral messages alone (in experiment one) and punishments alone (in the pre-message phase in experiment two) did not appear to guarantee high and persistent cooperation, the interactive e¤ect of punishments and a moral appeal did sustain cooperation at fairly high levels. This …nding that moral frames enhance the power of punishments is, to the best of our knowledge, completely novel.
To summarize, moral suasion has an e¤ect that goes beyond a basic demand e¤ect, and that is sensitive to the strategic environment. The e¤ect becomes persistent in games where players can separately decide on contributions and punishments. A natural question concerns the mechanisms through which moral suasion operates.
A …rst possible mechanism through which moral suasion may operate is by a¤ecting, perhaps temporarily, subjects'preferences. A moral message may raise the level of contribution subjects deem morally right regardless of what others do, or by raising the utility weight on meeting that level. This e¤ect entails a shift in a player's best response function, which we refer to as a preference e¤ect.
Another possibility is that messages change players'expectations about others. When a player does not care only about her own payo¤, her beliefs about the contributions of others may a¤ect her own contribution. Thus, it is possible that a moral message that is commonly observed may raise optimism about the contributions of others, and thus a¤ect behavior.
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In this way, moral messages may a¤ect behavior through changes in expectations, which we refer to as an expectation e¤ect.
We …nd that moral suasion triggers both preference and expectation e¤ects. To determine whether expectations matter at all we conducted a modi…ed version of our …rst experiment where we manipulated subjects'expectations of the probability that other players had seen the same message. We found that the e¤ects of a moral message became weaker when the 3 As is well known, di¤erent forms of other-regarding preferences make beliefs about the behavior of others relevant to one's own contribution. On preferences that di¤er from material payo¤s see Andreoni (1990) , Fehr et al. (1997) , Levine (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2002) among others. It is also well known that optimistic beliefs about the cooperation of others raise cooperation (Fischbacher et al. 2001 ).
probability that others had also seen the golden rule message was capped at 50%. This indicates that the expectation e¤ect is one way in which moral appeals work. It also implies that a social ampli…cation e¤ect is present: moral suasion is stronger when we are more con…dent that other players are getting the same message. This result has an important implication for organizing the delivery of normative content to groups: it pays to ensure all members know everyone is receiving the same content. 4 In order to determine whether a preference e¤ect also operates, we conducted another experiment were a subset of players knew that those with whom they were matched had seen a blank message. We found that among that subset, those receiving a moral message cooperated more than those seeing a blank message. The fact that moral messages have an e¤ect even when holding …xed the (blank) message seen by a subject's partner indicates that moral suasion operates partly by shifting the subject's preference over contributions.
The next section reviews related literature. Section 3 presents our …rst experiment and its results isolating the presence of moral suasion. Section 4 presents our results on the interaction between moral suasion and punishment, while Section 5 presents our third and fourth experiments investigating mechanisms. We conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of the limitations of our experiments, which can hopefully highlight valuable avenues for future research.
Related literature
The experimental study of cooperation boasts a rich tradition in economics and in political science. Most of the attention has been given to the power of extrinsic incentives to avoid the breakdown of cooperation. One example is the role of individual punishments in static environments (Ostrom et al 1992, Fehr and Gächter 2000) . Another example is the role of reputational concerns in repeated interactions (Roth and Murnighan 1978, Dal Bó 2005) .
For all the research investigating the power of extrinsic incentives to resolve cooperation problems, we have no equivalent knowledge on the role of moral suasion.
To the extent that the spheres of the normative and the positive have been linked in political science in relation to the problem of cooperation, the connection tends to go from the positive to the normative: for example, positive explanations for the development of norms have been given based on evolutionary considerations (e.g., Axelrod 1986) . 5 The possibility that the normative may a¤ect the positive is less well explored. And when normative notions have been investigated, the focus has been on the e¤ect of existing preferences and/or beliefs on, for instance, selected criteria of justice (see Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1990 , and references therein). What has been missing is evidence on whether exposure to moral ideas can change preferences or beliefs, and alter outcomes. The focus on change is important because it speaks to the potentialities of education and deliberation in promoting cooperation.
Previous literature has shown that communication between subjects can increase contributions in public good games (see Isaac et al. 1985 , Isaac and Walker 1988 , and Bochet et al. 2006 . As Dawes and Thaler (1988) emphasize, it has been conjectured that one channel for the power of communication could be to highlight moral dimensions of behavior.
However, research has shown communication to mainly act by creating mutual promises that emphasize an in-group vs out-group perspective (see Dawes and Thaler 1988 for a discussion and further references.) An advantage of our design is we can control subjects' exposure to distinctly ethical content. While our paper shows that communication with moral con-tent from the experimenter can a¤ect contributions, future research should study whether communication with moral content among subjects has similar e¤ects.
To our knowledge this paper is the …rst to report a laboratory study of the e¤ect of moral suasion on contributions in public good games. Interestingly, in his well known survey Ledyard (1995) mentions that moral suasion is one of the forces that may a¤ect behavior in such games but remains unexplored. Our paper is not the …rst to include moral suasion in experiments, however. Bohm (1972) compares revealed willingness to pay in a public good …eld experiment across mechanisms, some of which included moral statements. However, his experiment does not allow for a study of the e¤ect of moral statements because the type of mechanism varied together with the presence of those statements.
Field experiments on the e¤ect of normative appeals on tax evasion have found no e¤ects (see McGraw and Scholz 1991 , Blumenthal et al. 2001 , and Fellner et al. 2013 . 6 The exception is Schwarz and Orleans (1967) , but their design confounds normative appeals with other factors that can a¤ect compliance. Besides di¤erences in sample selection and size, substantial time may elapse between treatment and action in …eld experiments. Subjects may also suspect a sel…sh manipulation from an authority that is seeking to collect a tax or a fee, and disregard normative appeals. Moreover, the norms of fairness and responsibility that have been invoked in previous experimental work lacked a clear ethical underpinning.
These issues raise the question of whether moral suasion is always ine¤ective. The results of our paper can be interpreted as capturing the e¤ect of moral framing; see Andreoni (1995) for the e¤ect of framing on public good games. This section covers an experiment that shows that exposure to moral appeals a¤ects cooperative behavior.
Experimental design
We conducted 21 experimental sessions at XLAB, UC Berkeley with a total of 320 subjects.
The subjects were UC Berkeley students. Subjects interacted exclusively through individual computer terminals using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007) . These terminals were separated by lateral partitions that prevented subjects from observing the screens of other subjects'computers. Subjects were paid privately at the end of the session by XLAB per-7 On the e¤ect of recommendations on coordination games see Van Huyck et al. (1992) and Brandts and MacLeod (1995) . There is also a literature on how laws can express expected rules of behavior and a¤ect behavior, see Cooter (1995) , Bohnet and Cooter (2005) and Galbiati and Vertova (2008) . 8 Framing plays a role in dictator games, too. Brañas Garza (2006) shows an increase in giving in dictator games where dictators are reminded that "the other player is in your hands,"indicating that a framing that raises personal responsibility for the payo¤ of others can be e¤ective. Communication between subjects in dictator games may induce similar e¤ects (Andreoni and Rao 2009). sonnel. The experimenter's server allocated subjects randomly to groups of eight people.
In each round, each player was randomly matched by the server to another person in the group. In each round subjects received an endowment of 10 experimental points (or EPs -the exchange rate was 12 EPs for one dollar), and had to decide how much of those to allocate to a personal account and a joint account. Subjects could choose to contribute any number between 0 and 10 up to two decimal points. EPs allocated to the personal account went directly into the person's earnings. EPs going to the joint account got multiplied by an e¢ ciency factor of 1:4, and then divided between the two participants in the interaction. Therefore, the individual return for placing one EP in the joint account was only 0:7 of an EP. It follows that although the Utilitarian optimum and e¢ cient symmetric outcome would be for both players to contribute their whole endowments (leading to payo¤s of 14 for each) the Nash equilibrium is for both to contribute zero to the joint account (yielding 10 for each).
After each round, players got randomly rematched to another member of their group.
After ten rounds, subjects saw a message on their computer screens, randomly selected by the server from a set of …ve possible messages. All subjects in the same eight-person group saw the same message. These messages are detailed in Table 1 . One was a blank message (henceforth "Blank"), another one contained a suggestion to contribute without moral content (henceforth "Suggestion"), another one expressed the fact that in game theory rational and sel…sh individuals maximize their own payo¤s (henceforth "Nash"), and the other two were the moral messages. One of these messages expressed that an action is moral if it treats others as you would like to be treated by others (henceforth "Golden Rule"). The other one expressed the Act-Utilitarian standard according to which individual actions are moral if they maximize the sum of all players'payo¤s (henceforth "Utilitarian").
Two aspects of the moral messages are worth discussing. One is the reason to include two di¤erent moral messages. The other one is the precise wording of these messages. The reason to include two di¤erent moral messages is that they express very di¤erent principles.
While the Utilitarian message is consequentialist (the moral tenor of actions depends on their consequences) the Golden Rule principle abstracts from consequences and appeals to a reversibility property (act in a way towards others that you would have others act towards you). As such, this standard is more duty-based, and therefore can be related more closely to the main opponent of consequentialist ethics, namely the deontological, Kantian view expressed in the categorical imperative.
9 A natural question is whether moral messages matter at all, and if so, whether consequentialist arguments are more or less powerful than duty-based ones.
The precise wording of messages sought to make as clear as possible the messages and their implications. Both moral messages as well as the morality-free suggestion to contribute included an added sentence stating "If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate 10 to the joint account." This wording surely has both pros and cons. The main disadvantage is that, if e¤ects are found, one will wonder whether the results would persist with messages that do not spell out the full implications of the normative standard conveyed. The key advantage is that it secures understanding by subjects, and we judged this to be the stronger consideration when taking a …rst step in this research agenda. Thus, if no e¤ects were found, one could not argue this had been due to players not fully understanding the normative implications of the messages. The objective of this paper is to investigate if at least one version of moral suasion can be e¤ective, and not whether any or all moral communications will be. Future work should address variations in message wording.
Players were informed about all details of the game, and about the fact that a message randomly selected by the computer from a set of messages would be shown to them after round 10. At the end of the experiment subjects answered a questionnaire. They were asked to identify the message they had seen, and to provide information about their …eld of study, gender, SAT scores, and ideology (ranking from 0, most liberal, to 10, most conservative).
Results
The 320 subjects were divided in eight groups of eight people per message. Subjects earned an average of $23:18, with a minimum of $18:35 and a maximum of $29:81. Given that sessions lasted on average less than an hour, the earnings represent a reasonable hourly rate.
A high number of subjects (87%) correctly remembered at the end of the experiment the message that had been shown to their group.
Panel A of Table 2 and Figure 1 show the evolution of contributions to the joint account by round and message. In the …rst part of the experiment (rounds 1 to 10) the evolution of contributions follows the usual pattern: contributions are substantial at the beginning but decrease as the players gain experience. 10 It is important to note that there are no signi…cant di¤erences in behavior across groups that ended seeing di¤erent messages, consistent with the random assignment of messages.
Did messages a¤ect behavior? From Table 2 we can see that for all messages but the moral messages, contributions were smaller in the second part of the experiment than in the …rst part. Figure 2 shows in two ways the increase in contributions after the messages were displayed. In the …rst panel of Figure 2 we plot the change in average contributions from the …rst 10 rounds (pre-message) to the last 10 rounds (post-message). The second panel of Figure 2 shows the change in average contributions from round 10 to round 11.
To statistically compare the contribution increases that occur in the post-message phase, throughout the paper we aggregate individual contributions at the level of the group and 10 For a summary of the literature on public good games see Ledyard (1995) .
perform Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (when appropriate we will perform sign-rank tests). We compute the p-values by following the steps of the randomization inference approach. We reassign treatment status 30,000 times and compute the distribution of the Wilcoxon statistic.
The p-value is the proportion of realized values of the statistic under treatment re-assignment that lie above (or below, when appropriate) the empirical value. Our tests are one-tailed, which is appropriate given that the comparisons we test have a predicted direction. We hypothesize that moral messages increase contributions relative to all other messages, that the Suggestion message increases contributions relative to the Blank and Nash messages, and that the Nash message decreases contributions relative to the Blank message. The p-values corresponding to the Wilcoxon tests for contribution di¤erences across conditions in our …rst experiment are reported in Table 2 , panel B.
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We focus …rst on the change in average contributions from the …rst 10 rounds (premessage) to the last 10 rounds (post-message). We …nd that the increase in contributions under the moral messages is greater than the increase under the blank message (p-values of 0:053 and 0:007 for Golden Rule and Utilitarian respectively). On the other hand there are no signi…cant di¤erences in terms of a decrease of contributions under Nash or an increase under Suggestion relative to Blank (p-values of 0:16 and 0:46 respectively). More importantly, the increase in contributions under the moral messages is greater than under Suggestion (pvalues of 0:019 and 0:004 for Golden Rule and Utilitarian respectively). This shows that it is not just the recommendation of a given contribution level that a¤ects behavior, but that the explicitly moral part of the statement has an e¤ect. This indicates that the overall e¤ect of the moral messages cannot be attributed exclusively to an experimenters'demand e¤ect.
12 11 The results are robust to performing statistical tests at the individual subject level clustering by group. 12 The e¤ect of moral messages on average contributions is due to an increase in contributions of both those who were already contributing and those who were not contributing before seeing the message. All results in the paper are maintained if we focus on the percentage of subjects making the maximum contribution. The results are also maintained if we focus on subjects that remembered the message they saw.
Similar results are obtained if we focus on the change from round 10 to 11 but some of the signi…cance levels are changed. Both the Utilitarian and Golden Rule messages generate signi…cant increases in contributions from round 10 to 11 relative to Blank (p-values of 0:0001 and 0:015, respectively -see Table 2 , Panel B). 13 The Suggestion message generates a signi…cant increase in contributions from round 10 to 11 relative to Blank (p-value of 0:009). The Golden Rule message generates an increase in contributions from round 10 to 11 that is statistically higher than that of the Suggestion message (p-value of 0:02). In other words, although the Suggestion message that is intended to capture demand e¤ects does have an impact on contributions in round 11, two facts are noteworthy. The increase in contributions from round 10 to 11 is higher for the moral messages, and this di¤erence is statistically signi…cant for the Golden Rule message. Second, the increase induced by the Suggestion message erodes immediately. Thus, the long-run e¤ect of messages seen as the impact on the average contribution in the post-message phase relative to the pre-message phase is only signi…cant for the moral messages. This tells us that messages that have an explicitly moral backing have stronger e¤ects than messages that demand contributions without a moral rationale.
We now discuss the size of the e¤ects while restricting attention to changes between rounds 10 and 11, and leave the examination of the size of persistent e¤ects for the following section. A restart e¤ect causes contributions to increase by 32% from rounds 10 to 11 under the Blank message. The Utilitarian message yields an increase in contributions of slightly over a 100% from round 10 to 11. The Golden Rule message causes contributions to almost 13 Since Andreoni and Vesterlund's (2001) study of altruistic preferences has shown that men are more likely to care about total payo¤s and women more likely to care about equality, we could expect the e¤ects of the two moral treatments to di¤er by gender. We …nd no signi…cant di¤erences in the response to messages between women and men. Also regarding the interaction of personal characteristics with the messages, we …nd little evidence of ideology a¤ecting the response to messages. The exception is that conservative subjects respond to the Nash message by contributing less than liberal subjects (p-value of 0.023 for average post-message vs pre-message contribution). 14 triple from round 10 to 11. These changes in contributions are associated with increases in payo¤s of 9% and 13% under the Utilitarian and Golden Rule messages, respectively. These e¤ects, though perhaps not very large, are not trivial, especially when considering that moral suasion, unlike pecuniary incentives, is not costly in itself.
Regarding the di¤erence between the two moral messages, we …nd that the Utilitarian message seems to have a greater impact than the Golden Rule when we compare part 2 versus 1 (i.e. post-versus pre-message phases) and the opposite happens when we compare round 11 versus 10, but these di¤erences are not signi…cant (p-values of 0:22 and 0:8 respectively).
One question to be dealt with in future research is whether the impact of moral messages is due to the fact that the messages are labeled as moral, or to the intrinsic appeal of the principles contained in those statements. In what follows we explore moral suasion in an enriched strategic environment, and later we turn to the issue of the mechanisms driving moral suasion.
Experiment 2: Moral suasion and punishment
The main take away from our …rst experiment is that moral appeals can be used to a¤ect cooperation. However, the e¤ects of moral appeals appeared transitory, which could be given at least two interpretations. One interpretation is that moral discourse can be an e¤ective, though short-lived, instrument to promote cooperation (incidentally, this might be a reason why exposure to normative messages in real life often akes on repetitive formse.g., attending mass once a week). Another interpretation is that players, though in principle willing to cooperate more in a persistent manner, eventually start to defect when they observe that not all players abide by the same principles. A player who wants to punish others after witnessing bad behavior but also wishes to be cooperative has a single instrument, his contribution level, to pursue two di¤erent objectives. The retraction of cooperative behavior may be less common when subjects have the ability to punish players that have been uncooperative through a speci…c punishment instrument. Therefore, it is of interest to study moral suasion in the context of a richer strategic environment to see whether a moral message can trigger a more persistent increase in cooperation. In our second experiment we added in each round a punishment stage after the contribution stage, as in Ostrom et al (1992) and Fehr and Gächter (2000) . This allowed players to punish low contributors without having to lower their own contributions.
Experimental design
The experimental design is as in our …rst experiment with two modi…cations. First, we focused on only two messages for reasons of statistical power: Blank and Golden Rule. We focused on the Golden Rule message as opposed to the Utilitarian one because the Golden Rule condition exhibited the least persistence in our …rst experiment. Therefore, the Golden Rule message should provide a more stringent test for whether the addition of punishments a¤ects the persistence of moral suasion. In addition, the Golden Rule is arguably a more universal message.
Second, the stage game was modi…ed to allow subjects to punish their partner after seeing his or her contribution. After players decided their contributions, a screen showed each her own and the other player's contribution and the payo¤s to each. Right after a new screen allowed them to lower the other player's payo¤. The cost of lowering the other player's payo¤ in one experimental point was one fourth of an experimental point.
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Results
We conducted six experimental sessions at XLAB, UC Berkeley with a total of 136 subjects.
Eight groups of eight people saw the Blank message and nine groups saw the Golden Rule message. The subjects were UC Berkeley students. Subjects earned an average of $20:71, with a minimum of $11:93 and a maximum of $25:45. A high number of subjects (85%) correctly remembered at the end of the experiment the message that had been shown to their group. Table 3 and Figure 3 show the evolution of contributions to the joint account by round and message. Contribution levels before subjects see the messages are greater than in experiment 1, when punishments were not available. This di¤erence is signi…cant (p-value of 0:0003). However, it is interesting to note that these high levels of contributions decrease with experience. In fact, the level of contributions in round 10 is signi…cantly smaller than in round 1 (p-value <0:0001). In other words, while punishments help raise the level of contributions in the absence of moral messages, they cannot prevent the erosion of cooperation.
Panel A in
In our new experiment the evolution of contributions before seeing the messages is the same regardless of the message, as it could be expected given the randomization of messages (p-value of 0:28 for rounds 1 to 10 and 0:44 for round 10). Surprisingly this is not always the case for punishments. The groups that ended seeing the moral message appeared to punish more in the …rst part of the experiment. Columns (3) and (4) in Panel A of Table 3 show the evolution of average punishment by round and treatment category. The di¤erence in average punishment across treatment categories is not statistically signi…cant for the …rst nine rounds or for the overall average of rounds 1 to 10 (p-value of 0:12) but it is signi…cant in round 10 (p-value of 0:005). Given the controlled nature of the experiment we attribute this imbalance to a random occurrence.
Did messages a¤ect contributions in the presence of punishment? From Table 3 and Figure 4 we see that, aggregating over all rounds before and after the message, the moral message has a positive e¤ect on contributions, while that is not the case for the Blank message. This di¤erence on the impact of the messages is signi…cant (p-value of 0:001 for all rounds -see Table 3 , Panel B for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test results). If we compare the change in contributions from round 10 to 11, we also …nd that Golden Rule has a signi…cantly di¤erent e¤ect from the Blank message (p-value of 0:0002). Figure 4 shows the di¤erential e¤ect of the moral messages when punishment is possible when we consider all rounds. The increase on the level of contributions caused by the moral message is signi…cantly larger in this experiment than in the …rst (pvalue of 0:012 in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test). This is reported in Table 4 which also shows that adding punishments did not change the e¤ect of the Blank message (p-values of 0:636 for all rounds and 0:9301 for rounds 10 and 11). Interestingly, we do not …nd a signi…cant di¤erence in the e¤ect of the moral message across experiments if we focus just on the rounds right before and after the message (p-value of 0:594). This indicates that the main impact of allowing punishments on the e¤ect of the moral message is not on the initial response but on the persistence of this response. In fact, this can be easily seen by comparing the evolution of contributions in the second part of experiments 1 and 2 for the Golden Rule message (compare Panels A in Tables 2 and 3 or Figures 1 and 3) . In our …rst experiment, where punishments were unavailable, contributions decreased markedly with experience after the moral message. This is no longer the case in Experiment 2 which allows for punishments.
The …rst graph in
The moral message interacts with the presence of punishment to increase cooperation and sustain it at higher levels.
An examination of the size of the e¤ects shows that while the average contribution under the Blank condition increases by around 5% from round 10 to 11, the average contribution under the Golden Rule condition increases by roughly 100%. Moreover, the persistent component of the e¤ects is nontrivial in this second experiment. The average contribution su¤ers a decrease of near 10% from round 10 to round 20 under the Blank condition, while the average contribution under the Golden Rule condition increases by 62% in between round 10 and the very last, round 20.
While it is not central for the issues studied in this paper, it is interesting to broadly examine the connection between moral suasion and punishments. Table 3 shows that the moral message signi…cantly increased punishment relative to the Blank message if we aggregate over rounds and compare the pre-and post-message phases (p-value of 0:0004).
However, if we focus on rounds 10 and 11 we …nd the opposite.
14 Given that lower contributions tend to trigger punishment, one would expect the moral message to have two e¤ects on the punishment meted out by a subject: one direct by changing the propensity to punish (holding the contribution of the other player constant), and one indirect and negative by raising the contribution of the other player. The reduction in punishment in groups that received the moral message relative to the Blank message can simply be explained by the increase in contributions in the former. However, the fact that moral messages increase both contributions and punishment when we consider all rounds suggests the moral message may increase the propensity to punish for a given level of contribution by the other.
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14 Consistently with the previous literature, we …nd that subjects tend to punish subjects that contributed less but there are also observations of perverse punishments (subjects that contributed little tend to punish subjects that contributed more than they did). See Fehr and Gächter (2000) , Anderson and Putterman (2006) and Carpenter (2007) . 15 Note however that our study is not designed to investigate this assertion in detail. A way to assess it would be to study the response of punishment to messages by keeping constant the subject and the combination of contributions by herself and her partner. However, not all subjects will be observed to engage in contributions at the same level after exposure to the message. Those who are may constitute a non-random sample, complicating a precise identi…cation of the e¤ects of moral suasion on the propensity to punish.
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How does moral suasion work?
The main conclusion from the …rst experiment is that exposure to moral appeals a¤ects cooperation rates, and that this e¤ect goes beyond a pure demand e¤ect. Moreover, the second experiment suggests that when players can separately decide on cooperation and punishment, the e¤ects of a moral message on cooperation can be persistent. A natural question is what drives the e¤ects of moral suasion.
One possibility is that moral suasion may a¤ect subjects'preferences by raising the level of contribution subjects deem morally right or by raising the utility weight on meeting that level. This preference e¤ect would results in a shift in a player's best response function.
A second possibility is that moral suasion changes players'expectations about the behavior of others. If individuals have a preference for reciprocity, they may want to contribute more if they expect others to do so. In that context, a moral message that is commonly observed may signal that others will contribute more, and a¤ect behavior. 16 This expectation e¤ect highlights a "social" aspect of moral suasion, namely that the e¤ectiveness of moral appeals could depend on the fact that individuals are interacting with others who are also receiving the moral appeal.
We use two experiments to determine whether expectation and preference e¤ects are present.
Experiment 3: Do expectations matter?
This section covers an experiment that shows that moral suasion a¤ects behavior in part through changes in the expectations about others.
Experimental design
To determine whether expectations play a role we replicated the experimental design of our …rst experiment with two modi…cations. First, we included only the Blank and the Golden Rule messages. Second, we allowed the random message to vary across subjects within the same group of eight. Subjects knew that the probability that any member of their group had seen the same message they had seen was capped at 50%. Since subjects in the same group could see di¤erent messages, the expectations held by anyone having seen the moral message that any peer had also seen it were necessarily lower than in the …rst experiment.
Therefore, if expectations were important to moral suasion we would expect the e¤ects to be weaker in this experiment than in our …rst one.
Results
There were 17 groups of eight subjects; 69 subjects saw the Blank message and 67 saw the Golden Rule message. The subjects were UC Berkeley students. Subjects earned an average of $23:10, with a minimum of $18:71 and a maximum of $27:71. A high number of subjects (91%) correctly remembered at the end of the experiment the message that had been shown to them. Table 5 and Figure 5 show the evolution of contributions to the joint account by round and message. As before, in the …rst part of the experiment (rounds 1 to 10) the evolution of contributions follows the usual pattern. Again, it is important to note that there are no signi…cant di¤erences in behavior across subjects that ended seeing di¤erent messages, consistent with the random assignment of messages.
Did messages a¤ect behavior di¤erently than in our …rst experiment? To answer this question we focus only on round 11. In that round, subjects in the Golden Rule condition in this experiment only di¤er from those in the …rst experiment in terms of their con…dence that their partner has seen the same message. After round 11 subjects in this experiment also face a di¤erence experience of play (they may encounter players that have seen a di¤erent message and, hence, behaved di¤erently). To isolate the role of the …rst e¤ect we focus on round 11.
From Table 5 and Figures 5 and 6 , we see that both Blank and Golden Rule result in an increase in average contributions from round 10 to 11 (a restart e¤ect). However, this increase is greater for the Golden Rule message (p-value of 0:01).
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More importantly, we compare the e¤ect of the moral message in this experiment to that in our …rst experiment. The e¤ect of the moral message is signi…cantly smaller in Experiment 3 than that observed in our baseline experiment when all subjects saw the same message (pvalue of 0:0036) while there are no di¤erences for the Blank message (p-value of 0:38). This suggests that expectations play a role in moral suasion and that preference e¤ects cannot explain the whole e¤ect of moral messages.
Experiment 4: Is there a preference e¤ect?
In this section we study whether moral suasion has an e¤ect on behavior that operates through preferences. In this experiment we hold …xed the message seen by a player's opponent, and compare the player's behavior depending on whether she has seen a Blank or a moral message. If, holding the other player's message (and information more generally) …xed, the contribution of a player increases under the moral message relative to the Blank one, this will mean that moral suasion a¤ects preferences, and that the role of expectations is complementary. If there is no such increase, this will mean that there are no e¤ects of moral suasion through preferences, and that their e¤ect is purely due to expectations.
Experimental Design
To determine whether moral suasion a¤ects preferences we replicated the experimental design of our …rst experiment with four modi…cations. First, we included only the Blank and the Golden Rule messages. Second, the choice of messages and matching of subjects was such that half the subjects saw that their opponent had seen the Blank message. Half of these "informed"subjects saw the Blank message and half saw the Golden Rule message. Subjects knew that if they were informed of their opponent's message the opponent was not informed about their own message. Third, subjects only participated in one round after the message to eliminate any possibility of repeated interaction e¤ects (which would complicate inference about e¤ects over preferences). 18 Finally, we adjusted the exchange rate to 8 EPs per dollar given the reduction in the number of rounds, so as to keep total average earnings at levels similar to those in experiment 1.
In summary, to test whether moral suasion has an e¤ect through preferences, we compare the behavior of subjects who received a Blank message with those that received the Golden Rule message while holding constant the message seen by those they were playing with (the Blank message).
18 Under several post-message rounds the following could happen: a subject i that sees the moral message could believe that people tend to imitate behavior and that the person j she is currently matched with may later interact with a person z who has also seen the moral message and who will be matched with i after having encountered j. Not wanting to unfavorably dispose z by sending her a frustrated partner j, i may behave better towards j for reasons other than a change in i 0 s preferences. Our design eliminates this possibility.
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Results
We conducted ten experimental sessions at XLAB, UC Berkeley with a total of 264 subjects.
Of these, 132 subjects saw the Blank message and received no information about the message seen by their partner. The other 132 were informed that their partner had seen the Blank message and saw themselves a Blank message in 66 cases, and the Golden Rule message in the other 66 cases. The subjects were UC Berkeley students. Subjects earned an average of $19:85, with a minimum of $15:06 and a maximum of $23:96. A high number of subjects (79%) correctly remembered at the end of the experiment the message that had been shown to them. Figure 7 show the evolution of contributions to the joint account by round and message for subjects that ultimately learned that their partner had seen the Blank message. As before, in the …rst part of the experiment (rounds 1 to 10) the evolution of contributions follows the usual pattern. Again, it is important to note that there are no signi…cant di¤erences in behavior across subjects that ended seeing di¤erent messages, consistent with the random assignment of messages.
From Table 6 and Figures 7 and 8 , we see that both Blank and Golden Rule result in an increase in average contributions from round 10 to 11 (there is again a small restart e¤ect).
However, this increase is greater for the Golden Rule message (p-value below 0:0001).
19 This suggests that moral suasion a¤ects behavior not only by a¤ecting expectations but also by a¤ecting preferences. 19 In this test the unit of observation is the average contribution by group and message for subjects that saw that their partner in round 11 had seen the Blank message. We then compare for these subjects the contribution rates in the same group by message using the non-parametric Wilcoxon sign-rank test for matched pairs.
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Conclusion
We report results from four experiments designed to study whether exposure to moral appeals a¤ects cooperative behavior. Moral suasion is ubiquitous in many domains of real life, from family relationships to organizational and political realms.
Our results indicate that the potential for persistent positive e¤ects depends on the richness of the strategic environment in which moral suasion is used. In our experiment, the interaction of moral suasion and the presence of punishments appears important to sustain cooperation when moral messages or punishments alone could not do so.
An important additional question pertains to the mechanisms through which moral suasion operates. Our design allowed us to identify that moral suasion is stronger when players are con…dent that others have been "treated" as well, highlighting a social ampli…cation of moral suasion linked to expectations about mutual behavior. When preferences are either purely pecuniary or based on a strictly individual moral imperative those expectation-driven e¤ects cannot arise. Their emergence suggests that moral suasion leverages a pro-social, but also reciprocity-based, aspect of preferences. Our experiments show that moral suasion operates also by a¤ecting preferences, holding expectations constant. In other words, moral suasion a¤ects what players expect from each other, but also "who they are" in terms of preferences.
The existence of social preferences such as those related to reciprocity motives is by now well known. However, the fact that social preferences can be leveraged to a¤ect behavior through relatively cheap methods such as ethical discourse is intriguing, especially when considering that the provision of material incentives-involving laws and regulations, monitoring, money-is costly. Future work should explore in more detail the variety of settings in which moral suasion can be e¤ective at shaping behavior, as well as investigate the interactions 25 between moral suasion and extrinsic incentives.
Some limitations of our experiments highlight yet other avenues for future research. Our experiments involved a restricted, and especially worded, set of messages, and therefore our results do not imply that every form of moral suasion will succeed. Thus, it would be important to investigate the power of messages when the full implications of the normative standard are not spelled out, and the power of messages that nominally invoke morality without actually conveying a moral standard or justi…cation. Lastly, it would be important to investigate moral suasion in various additional settings, both in the lab and the …eld. Please read this message carefully: The assumption of game theory is that rational and self-regarding individuals will maximize their own payoffs. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate 0 to the joint account.
Golden rule
Please read this message carefully: An action of yours is moral if it treats others the way you would like others to treat you. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate 10 to the joint account.
Utilitarian
Please read this message carefully: An action of yours is moral if it maximizes the sum of everyone's payoffs. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate 10 to the joint account.
5 Suggestion Please read this message carefully: You could consider allocating all your endowment to the joint account. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate 10 to the joint account. Note: we test the hypothesis that the change in contributions from part 1 to part 2 or from round 10 to 11 for groups in different experiments within treatment categories stem from different distributions, treating the change in the average contribution of each 8-person group as a single observation. Each observation is the difference in the change in contributions from round 10 to 11 between subjects that saw the Golden Rule and subjects that saw the Blank message in a group.
Round 10 vs 11 0.010 
